In an ever-changing environment, survival depends on learning which stimuli represent threat, 2 and also on updating such associations when circumstances shift. Humans can acquire 3 physiological responses to threat-associated stimuli even when they are unaware of them, but the 4 role of awareness in updating threat contingencies remains unknown. This complex process -5 generating novel responses while simultaneously suppressing learned ones -relies on distinct 6 neural mechanisms from initial learning, and has only been shown with awareness. Can it occur 7 unconsciously? Here we show that it can. Participants underwent classical threat conditioning to 8 visual stimuli that were suppressed from their awareness. One of two images was paired with an 9 electric shock; halfway through the experiment, contingencies were reversed and the shock was 10 paired with the other image. We found that physiological responses reflected changes in 11 stimulus-threat pairings independently of stimulus awareness, demonstrating the sophistication 12 of unconscious affective flexibility. 13 14 However, it is highly unlikely that across participants, random noise would yield consistent (and 132 
Introduction 15
Flexible responses to environmental threats are essential for adaptive behavior. Cues that predict 16 threat constantly change -new threats may arise while old ones cease to pose a risk. When 17 consciously perceiving such cues, we are able to flexibly update and shift threat responses from 18 one cue to another (1-3). But can we update our reaction to stimuli that predict danger when we 19 are not aware of them? It is known that threat-conditioned stimuli that are perceived without 20 awareness can still elicit defensive physiological reactions (4-7), and that new threat associations 21 can be formed through classical conditioning even without any awareness of the conditioned 22 stimuli (8-10). Updating threat associations when contingencies change, however, is an entirely 23 different matter: it involves a complex process of creating novel responses while simultaneously 24 suppressing acquired ones. To date, such updating has only been shown in humans who were 25 aware of the stimuli (2), and in animals under conditions where stimuli were fully available for 26 perceptual processing (11) ; these studies have shown, furthermore, that the neural substrates of 27 threat updating differ from those of the initial learning. It is thus unknown whether the 28 sophisticated re-evaluation involved in such affective flexibility requires awareness, or can be 29 accomplished without it. Here we show that it can, and furthermore, that stimulus awareness 30 does not seem to play a substantial role in such affective flexibility . 31 To examine this, we employed the reversal paradigm, a laboratory model that requires 32 flexible updating of threat contingencies (2). In an initial acquisition phase, participants 33 encounter two conditioned stimuli (CSs) and learn that only one of them predicts an electric 34 shock. Halfway through the experiment, with no warning, these contingencies flip, initiating the 35 reversal phase: Participants must flexibly learn that the formerly safe CS now predicts the shock 36
and that the old one no longer does. To assess learning, participants' physiological arousal is 37 recorded throughout the experiment, typically (and here) by measuring their skin conductance 4 responses. Appropriate response reversal requires a sophisticated form of updating, in that one 39 must learn to respond to a cue that now predicts threat while simultaneously inhibiting responses 40 to the previously threatening cue that is now safe. 41
To see whether reversal of conditioned threat requires awareness, we had a large group of 42 participants (N = 86) undergo reversal learning with the CSs suppressed from awareness by 43 continuous flash suppression (CFS), a technique commonly used to examine unconscious 44 perception (10, 12-14): The CSs were visual images presented monocularly, while the other eye 45 was shown a high-contrast, dynamic image (the CFS mask) at the corresponding retinal location 46 (See Figure 1 for a description of the design and procedure). 47 CFS can suppress images from awareness for several seconds. However, it is also known that 48 its effectiveness may vary across trials and individuals, and the suppressed stimulus may "break 49 through" the suppression (15). Over the last decade, a growing body of work has raised concerns 50 that the standard approach -removing from analysis data (participants and trials) in which 51 breakthrough had occurred -may bias the findings (16, 17; See Supplementary Methods for 52 further details of these issues.) Here, we adopt a number of methodological approaches to ensure 53 our results are robust to these potential concerns. 54
Specifically, we remove no data and instead incorporate individual levels of reported 55 stimulus awareness, as well as response patterns that might reflect residual awareness, into a 56 regression model accounting for physiological responses. The model also adjusts for baseline 57 anxiety (which has been previously shown to correlate with unconscious learning; (10)). 58
Additionally, we use a Bayesian approach to establish that a model in which participants were 59 updating their learning provides a better account for the findings than a model in which they 60 were simply (and independently of the stimulus) predicting the probability of a shock on the next 61 trial (18). Finally, in order to verify that our procedure is able to induce reversal learning when 62 participants are aware of the stimuli (so that if no learning or updating were found under CFS, 63 we could rule out the possibility this may be simply due to an ineffective procedure) we ran a no-64 CFS group (N = 12), in which participants also viewed the CSs monocularly (as the CFS group 65 did), but were aware of them as no CFS masks were presented to their other eye. 66
We hypothesized that physiological responses to threat can be flexibly reversed without 67 perceptual awareness. We find that reversal indeed occurs independently of CS awareness, and 68 that there is strong evidence for the reversal of threat learning even in its complete absence. 69
Results

70
Overall assessment of physiological reversal learning 71 To assess the physiological arousal evoked by CSs, we used a model-based approach (19) to 72 estimate the amplitude of anticipatory sudomotor nerve activity (SNA) from skin conductance 73 data recorded during stimulus presentation. A variational Bayes approximation was employed to 74 invert a forward model that describes how hidden SNA translates into observable SCRs (see 75
Materials and Methods). Previous work has shown that this approach is more sensitive than 76 conventional SCR peak-to-peak analysis (19-21). Figure 2A shows the time course of evoked 77 SNA to Spiders A and B, separately for the CFS and no-CFS groups. In both groups, responses 78 to Spider A relative to Spider B were larger during the acquisition phase and smaller during the 79 reversal phase. To quantify the magnitude of physiological reversal learning, we calculated a 80 reversal learning index for each participant (see Materials and Methods). The reversal learning 81 index was positive and significantly greater than zero for both the CFS and no-CFS groups 82 ( Figure 2B) . A linear mixed model (see Materials and Methods for details) revealed a significant 83 interaction of stage and spider in both groups (CFS: β = 0.27, t (2935) = 4.23, P = < 0.001; no-84 CFS: β = 1.23, t (2935) = 7.29, P = < 0.001). Note that a significant interaction is formally 85 equivalent to a significant reversal learning index. On its own, however, it simply reveals a 86 difference in the comparative magnitude of responses to the two CSs across the two halves of the 87 experiment; follow-up tests show that this difference is indeed due to reversal: Spider A evoked 88 greater responses than Spider B in the acquisition phase (CFS: t (341.9) = 3.0, P = 0.003; no-89 CFS: t (201.1) = 4.6, P < 0.001) and the pattern was reversed in the reversal phase (CFS: t 90 (341.9) = 2.8, P = 0.005; no-CFS: t (341.9) = 3.6, P = 0.0003). These results indicate that 91 reversal learning was evident in both groups. Although Figure 2 shows that it was more 92 pronounced in the no-CFS group, we note that this difference is not straightforwardly 93 interpretable because the no-CFS group (a control, intended to rule out an ineffective 94 manipulation if no effect was found for the CFS group) was substantially smaller; furthermore, 95 as addressed in detail below, suppression from awareness was very heterogenous in the CFS 96 group. 97
As previous work has found a negative association between anxiety and threat acquisition 98 with and without awareness (10), we also calculated correlations between the CFS group's 99 baseline anxiety measures (STAIT, STAIS, FSQ) and the reversal learning index. Overall, 100 reversal learning decreased significantly with increasing levels of state and trait anxiety, and to a 101 lesser but non-significant extent for spider phobia ( Figure 2C ). 102
Reversal learning and perceptual awareness 103
The CFS manipulation reduced awareness of the CSs; as expected, however, it was differentially 104 effective in doing so across participants, precluding an overall conclusion that all learning under 105 CFS happened non-consciously. The CFS group showed significantly lower accuracy in response 106
to the "which seen?" question (M = 0.46, SD = 0.29) compared to the no-CFS group (M = 0.86, 107 SD = 0.16; t (22.77) = -7.24, P < 0.001), and accuracy in the CFS group was not significantly 7 different from the 50% random-response level (t (85) = -1.21, P = 0.229). The CFS group also 109 showed lower confidence (M = 1.73, SD = 0.65) than the no-CFS group (M = 2.83, SD = 0.08; t 110 (95.38) = -15.05, P < 0.001). 111
However, group differences in accuracy and confidence, and even random-level response 112 accuracy, are not sufficient to establish an absence of perceptual awareness in the CFS group. 113
Notably, average confidence of correct responses in this group was low but significantly greater 114 than the minimum value of 1 (t (77) = 10.79, P < 0.001), suggesting that at least some 115 participants were aware of some of the CSs; learning might thus have arisen from a subset of 116 trials and/or participants where such awareness occurred. To address this, we quantified CS 117 awareness by calculating an awareness index for each participant, ranging in possible values 118 from 0 for no awareness to 1 for full awareness (see Materials and Methods). Although the 119 awareness index of the CFS group (M = 0.28, SD = 0.34) was significantly lower than the no-120 CFS group's (M = 0.92, SD = 0.18; t (23.93) = -10.19, P < 0.001), it was still significantly 121 higher than zero (t (85) = 7.59, P < 0.001). 122 Therefore, in order to test our main hypothesis that the reversal of acquired threat responses 123 can be achieved without perceptual awareness, we characterized the quantitative relation 124 between the level of awareness and the magnitude of reversal learning in the CFS group. To 125 control for possible artifacts of regression to the mean (see Supplementary Methods), we 126 followed the recommendation (16) to first examine the correlation between two independent 127 estimates of the awareness index, one calculated from even-numbered trials, the other from odd-128 numbered trials. Because noise at the measurement level might occasionally yield extreme (i.e., 129 very low or very high) awareness index scores, an association of such randomly-extreme scores 130 with reversal learning (specifically, low awareness with intact learning) could be an artifact. similarly extreme) measurements in separate estimates. Due to regression to the mean, if random 133 extreme values occur in one of the two estimates, they are less likely to occur in the other, 134 resulting in a considerable attenuation of any correlation between the two. We found, however, 135 that the two measures were strongly correlated (r (84) = 0.96, P < 0.001; Figure 3A ); 136 participants' awareness level in one set of trials was overwhelmingly predictive of their 137 awareness in the other set, confirming their reliability as estimates of awareness. 138
Next, we examined the association between the awareness index and the reversal learning 139 index, using values of both indices obtained separately from even ( Figure 3B ) and odd ( Figure  140 3C) trials. As the color-coding of Figure 3 shows, the relation between individual participants' 141 awareness and their reversal learning was highly consistent across these separate measurements. 142
In light of this, we pooled the data from all trials and regressed the reversal learning index on the 143 perceptual awareness index ( Figure 3D ). The parameter of interest was the intercept, i.e., the 144 magnitude of reversal learning at zero perceptual awareness. The intercept was positive and 145 significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the awareness index regressor did not contribute 146 significantly to prediction of reversal learning; importantly, this finding was even stronger in 147 models that accounted for STAIT scores and a binary factor indicating whether participants were 148 tracking the stimuli with their responses (see Materials and Methods; Figure 3E and Table 1) . 149
Comparing learning and expectation-based accounts 150
Well-controlled lab-based conditioning procedures require strict constraints that preclude 151 complete randomization of the number and order of different CSs; this comes with a cost: 152 participants are able to develop expectations with above-chance validity, based on the sequence 153 of trials so far, about the likelihood of a shock on any upcoming trial (18). Even without any 154 awareness of the CSs, a participant should have been able to distinguish two types of trials: reinforced (with shock) and non-reinforced (no-shock). In a study with two CSs and a 100% 156 reinforcement rate like ours, such expectations would correspond to an anticipated pattern of 157 alternating trial-types (shock/no-shock or vice versa), with an increase in shock anticipation after 158 every no-shock trial. The question, therefore, was whether the physiological responses we had 159 measured might simply reflect participants' pattern-based anticipation of shock, rather than 160 learning of the contingencies associated with the CSs. 161
To answer this question, we used a Bayesian approach to compare the probability of our 162 findings being accounted for by a classic Rescorla-Wagner learning model (22) Notably, a previous study (10) that used CFS to investigate acquisition of threat responses 198 without awareness of the stimuli found that such acquisition can occur, but is rapidly forgotten. 199
The present study again showed that such acquisition can occur (and, additionally, be reversed), 200 but did not find the same rapid forgetting. The reasons for this are unclear, but we speculate that 201 the difference may be due to specific aspects of the stimuli, design and procedure: our use of 202 pictures of spiders (rather than the faces used in the previous study) and a 100% (rather than 203 50%) reinforcement protocol may have altered the temporal characteristics of acquisition. The experiment consisted of 16 acquisition trials followed by 16 reversal trials. One of two 247 spider images was presented on each trial. The spider images were schematic and had similar 248 low-level features. During acquisition, spider A always terminated with a shock and spider B never did. Reversal occurred halfway through the experiment: spider B now terminated with a 250 shock and spider A did not. The spider stimuli were presented for 6 s each in pseudorandomized 251 order. One of four possible trial orders was used for each participant. Orders were generated by 252 imposing specific constraints on the trial order, such that the first trial was always reinforced and 253 no more than two of the same trial type ever occurred consecutively. 254
Trial order and spider identity were counterbalanced across participants. To assess the 255 effectiveness of the awareness manipulation (35), 1 s after the offset of every CS participants 256 were shown the question "Which seen?" (1 = flower, 2 = spider; notably, flowers were never 257 shown, meaning the question addressed detection rather than discrimination as it could be 258 answered correctly even with a brief glimpse). This was followed by the question "How 259 confident?" (1 = guess to 3 = sure; participants were instructed to indicate how confident they 260 were of the flower/spider answer they had just given). Both questions were presented binocularly 261
(1.5 -2 s each, during which responses had to be given by pressing number keys on a standard 262 keyboard). The second question was followed by an 8 to 10 s inter-trial interval. 263 
Psychophysiological stimulation and measurement
Reversal Learning Index 301
An estimate of SNA was obtained for each trial. We expected Spider A to evoke greater SNA 302 than Spider B during the acquisition phase, and Spider B to evoke greater SNA than Spider A 303 during the reversal phase. The strength of reversal learning can thus be quantified by calculating, 304 separately for the acquisition and reversal phases, the difference between the average SNA 305 evoked by each spider. To quantify the degree of reversal (which is formally equivalent to the 306 interaction of phase and stimulus), the reversal learning index was calculated by subtracting the 307 difference between mean SNAs evoked by each spider during reversal from the difference during 308 acquisition (the larger the index, the greater the magnitude of reversal learning): 309
(2) 310
To formally test for group differences in the strength of reversal learning, we computed a 311 linear mixed model using the lme4 library in R. We used the skin conductance response (converted to a model-based measure of sudomotor nerve activity, SNA) as the dependent 313 variable and entered group (CFS, no-CFS), stage (acquisition, reversal), and spider (spider A, 314 spider B) as well as a continuous variable for trial (to account for habituation) as predictors. The 315 random structure of the model included an intercept and slopes for stage and spider. 316
Assessments of perceptual awareness 317
Perceptual awareness index 318
To characterize participants' reported awareness of CSs, each trial was assigned a perceptual 319 awareness score, defined by a combination of detection and confidence responses: Correct 320 answers with a confidence rating of 1 (guess) and incorrect answers irrespective of confidence 321 were assigned an awareness score of 0; correct answers with a confidence rating of 2 (medium) 322
were assigned a score of 0.5, and correct answers with a confidence rating of 3 (high) were 323 assigned an awareness score of 1. A perceptual awareness index was calculated for each 324 participant by averaging awareness scores across all trials. 325
Stimulus-response association patterns ("tracking") 326
We also assessed response patterns across trials, to see whether participants were able to track 327 stimuli with their responses, accurately discriminating the images despite not being able to label 328 them. We plotted individual trial-by-trial responses to the question "Which seen?", overlaid on 329 the trial-by-trial presentation of spiders (spider A, spider B; Figure S1A ). We then calculated the 330 number of consecutive "hits", defined as the number of consecutive trials where these two time-331 courses were either identical or consistently in opposition, suggesting that there was a possible 332 association between the stimulus and the response during those trials. The probability of such 333 consecutive hits occurring by chance alone can be derived as follows: 334
Let p = 0.5 be the probability of a hit, k the number of consecutive hits, n the number of trials 335 left, i the number of consecutive hits already observed; the chance of observing k consecutive 336 hits for the remaining n trials can then be formulated as a recursive problem: 337
(3) 338 which can be solved analytically with dynamic programming or recursion. Trivially, fp, k(k, n) = 339 1 for n ≥ 0 since k consecutive hits have already been observed, and fp, k (i, n) = 0 for k − i > n 340 since there are not enough trials left to observe k consecutive hits. 341
For example, assuming we want to know how likely it is to observe k = 8 consecutive hits 342 within n = 32 trials given p = 0.5, i.e., f0.5, 8 (0, 32), we find that this yields a probability of 343 0.050. 344
Alternatively, the probability can be derived by simulation for all possible numbers of 345 consecutive hits within 32 trials (i.e., from 1 to 31). For each possible number, we thus also 346 simulated 10 5 draws of a binomial distribution and calculated the average probability of that 347 number of hits being consecutive. As can be seen in Figure S1B , the result for 8 consecutive hits 348 (0.04991) was very close to the analytical solution. Fifteen participants showed evidence of 349 tracking the spiders or the shocks with their responses (8 or more consecutive hits); notably, 3 of 350 these participants appeared to have a perceptual awareness index of zero. We thus adjusted our 351 subsequent analysis with an additional binary covariate, indicating whether participants did or 352 did not show 8 or more consecutive hits. 353
Comparing learning and expectation-based models 354
The Rescorla-Wagner model (22) describes how the prediction for each trial is updated 355 according to a prediction error and learning rate: 356
where xn is the conditioned stimulus on trial n (Spider A or Spider B), and δn is the punishment 358 prediction error that measures the difference between the expected and the actual shock (rn) on 359 trial n. The learning rate α for the value update is a constant free parameter. The value for the CS 360 not observed on trial n remains unchanged. To derive the best fits for the Rescorla-Wagner 361 model, we assumed that V0 = 0.5, reflecting the assumption that getting a shock or not was 362 equally likely for the first trial. 363
For the alternative trial-sequence learning model, we assumed that a participant expecting a 364 strict sequence of alternating trial types (shock/no shock or vice versa) would update this 365 expectation according to the actually encountered trial types and a constant learning rate: 366
where V'n+1 is the expected trial type switch at trial n+1 (if V'n+1 is larger than 0.5, a trial switch 368 is expected), α' is the learning rate, and δ'n is the prediction error. The prediction error 369 corresponds to the difference between the actual trial type switch for trial n (r'n; coded as one for 370 a trial type switch and zero for an equal trial type) and the expectation for trial n. A changing 371 trial type for trial n was tracked by τn, which was one if the preceding trial was zero and zero if 372 the preceding trial type was one. To map these expectations onto expected values, we assumed 373 that 374 (6) 375
where the expected value for trial n+1 was calculated according to whether a trial type switch 376 was expected (V' > 0.5) or not. 377
We performed a formal model comparison between the conventional Rescorla-Wagner 378 model and the trial switch model for our data set ( Figure S2 ), using maximum likelihood 379 estimation and non-linear optimization (implemented with the fmincon function in MATLAB 380
R2016b (The Mathworks Inc, Natick, MA, USA). Using the log likelihood, we calculated the 381 Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to compare the two models as follows: 382
where n is the number of data points, k is the number of regressors, and ^ is the maximized 384 value of the likelihood function. to the other eye). One image (spider A) always terminated with a mild electric shock to the wrist, 496
whereas the other (spider B) never did. Halfway through the experiment, with no warning, the 497 contingencies flipped and the reversal phase began: the formerly safe stimulus (spider B) now 498 predicted the shock, and the old threat-associated one (spider A) was now safe. Each spider was 499 shown 8 times in each phase. Trial order was pseudorandomized (see Materials and Methods) 500
and spider identity (A and B) was counterbalanced across participants. To assess the success of 501 the awareness manipulation, participants answered the questions "Which seen?" (1=flower, 502 2=spider) and "How confident?" (1=guess to 3=sure), presented binocularly (1.5 -2 s each), 503 beginning 1 s after the offset of every CS, and followed by an 8-10 s inter-trial interval (the 504 questions are only shown here for the first depicted trial, but were repeated in all trials). 505
Participants who underwent the same procedure without CFS were shown identical CSs, but the 506 CFS mask was absent. 
